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Smith, 2 Bing. 156; Leader v. Noxon, 2 Win. Black. 924; Cal
lender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 434; British Oastplate Co. v. Meredith,
4 Term Rep. 794; Shearman & Redfield, sect. 371; NYewell v.
Wright, 3 Allen 166; Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29; Jones v.
Bird, 5 B. & Ad. 837; Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Grattan 230.
And the reason why the principle of respondeat superior dois
not apply is, that such officers have no means except such as belong
to themselves to satisfy the claim for damages, while on the other
hand, in order to infer .personal responsibility, direct personal
culpability must be brought personally home to such officer: Hol-
liday v. Vestry of &. Leonard, 4 L. T. N. S. 406.
In concluding this article, it is hardly necessary to remind the
reader, that with respect to some of the propositions there exists
great diversity of judicial opinion, resulting partly, from the fact,
that some of the courts have proceeded entirely upon common-law
principles, and the cases here cited are believed to be representative
of this class ; others have proceeded upon the principles of the civil
law relating to servitudes and the analogies to be drawn from them,
while courts distinguished for their learning have adopted a line of
decision involving principles essentially variant from those, either
of the common or the civil law, but believed by them to be more
m harmony with the organic law of the state whence they
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The validity of a contract in restraint of trade depends upon the reasonableness
of the contract, and there is no other rule limiting the area over which the contract
extends.
If the extent of the restraint upon one party is not greater than protection to the
other party requires, the contract is reasonable and valid.
Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, Law Rep., 15 Eq. 59, disapproved of.
A contract against public policy will not be supported by English courts, no
matter where it may be made, and the policy of English law extends its favor to
foreign traders.
Where a judgment was obtained in France against a domiciled Swiss, resident in
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England, without notice being given to him, held, that the judgment was not
binding.
Sdibsby v. Westenholz, Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 155, approved.
The circumstances which impose a duty on a defendant to obey a judgment of a
foreign court stated.
THIS was an action to restrain the defendant from carrying on
business as a champagne merchant and for damages, under the
following circumstances :-
The plaintiffs, Jean Roussillon and his son, were partners, carry-
ing on the business of champagne merchants at Epernay, in
France, and having also an office in London. The business was
formerly wholesale and retail.
In 1866, the plaintiffs took the defendant (who was a Swiss
subject und a nephew of Jean Roussillon), into their employment
at Epernay, and he resided with them at Epernay for some time
learning the business. In 1867 he was sent to England to acquire
a knowledge of the English language, and he was in that year
introduced to the plaintiffs' customers in England and Scotland as
their traveller.
In 1869 (being then of the age of nineteen), the defendant
returned to Geneva, and in September of that year he was emanci-
pated according to the law of the canton of Geneva. The effect
of such emancipation was to make him &Ui jurzs, and to enable
him to contract as fully as though he were of full age.
In October 1869, the defendant visited Epernay, and whilst in
his uncle's house wrote a letter in the French language, of which
the following is a translation :-
"Monsieur J. ROUSSILLON,-
"As a return for the kindness and care of which I have been
the object, and the trouble you have taken in my commercial
education, I address this letter to you as a proof that I undertake
not to represent any other champagne house for two years after
having left you, if at any time I leave your house for any reason
whatever, whether it be on your part or on my own. I also under-
take not to establish myself nor to associate myself with other
persons or houses in the champagne trade for ten years, in case I
should leave you as already mentioned above. I enter into these
engagements trusting to your assurance that I may rest in the idea
that my position is assured in your house, except in the event oi
unforeseen events, or of negligence on my part in the affairs which
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are, or shall be, intrusted to me, and I promise to do all in my
power to maintain and increase the good reputation of your house
in the countries I am connected with.
"Your affectionate nephew,
"AUGTE. ROUSSILLON."
The defendant continued as traveller to the plaintiffs, until
TMarch 1877, when he voluntarily left them. It appeared by the
evidence that he transacted business for them in England and
Scotland, and on one occasion in Holland. He was paid by com-
missions. He also travelle4 for another wine merchant for wines
other than champagne.
Early in 1877 the plaintiffs gave up the retail part of their
business.
In February 1878, the defendant established himself in London
as a champagne merchant, and by advertisement, and by his trade
circulars and labels, described himself as of "Ay, Champagne,"
although he had no establishment there (Ay being in the neighbor-
hood of Epernay).
In September 1878, the plaintiffs instituted an action against
the defendant in the Tribunal of Commerce, sitting at Epernay,
for damages by reason of the breach of the agreement contained
in the above-stated letter, and to restrain him from further breach
thereof; and on the 6th of November following obtained a judg-
ment, of which the following is a translation:-
"Says that Auguste Roussillon should not represent any cham-
pagne house for two years from the commencement of the year
1878, and that during ten years from the same period he should
not carry on business as a champagne merchant, either on his own
account or in partnership.
" Orders that in a week following notice of the present judgment
he shall completely cease to trade as a champagne merchant, and
shall suppress the words 'Ay, Champagne,' and the mention of
champagne wine from his labels, advertisements and circulars.
This under the penalty of 100 francs damages per day for non-
compliance for two months after which right shall be enforced.
"Empowers plaintiffs from this day to seize labels, advertise-
ments, circulars, &c., of Auguste Roussillon having advertisements
of champagne wines.
"Condemns Auguste Roussillon to pay 50 francs for damages
for proved contravention; condemns him besides to pay 15,000
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fi'anes in compensation for the damage done to this day to
plaintiff.
"Authorizes the plaintiff to insert the present judgment in six
newspapers of the Marne Department, three Paris newspapers,
five English newspapers, and to have fifty bills posted at Epernay,
Reims, Ay, and in England, all at the expense of the said Auguste
Roussillon.
" Condemns Auguste Roussillon to the prepaid costs, amounting
to twenty-one francs eighty-five centimes, besides the law expenses
of the present judgment."
As the defen jant continued to carry on business after notice of
the above judgment bad been served on him, the plaintiffs com-
menced this action to restrain him from representing any eham-
pagne house for two years from the 1st day of March 1877, and
from carrying on business as a champagne merchant for a period
of ten years from the same date, and to obtain the sum of 8911. 9s.
in respect of the above-stated judgment, and a sum of 5001. in
respect of further breaches since the judgment.
It appeared by the evidence that the defendant never was a
domiciled Frenchman, that his visits to France were of a limited
duration, and that he had had no intention of remaining there.
That the proceedings in France were taken entirely without his
knowledge, and that the first notice he had of any such proceed-
ings was in November 1878, when the judgment was handed to
him.
A French advocate, who was called as a witness by the plain-
tiffs, gave evidence that by the law of France a judgment became
void unless executed within six months, or unless everything that
could be was done to obtain execution. He also proved that con-
tracts in restraint of trade are not void by the law of France.
Cookson, Q. C., and S. Dickinson, for the plaintiffs.-The first
point, assuming this to be an English contract, is as to the
adequacy of the consideration. The judgment of Lord Chief
Justice KENYON in Davig v. Mason, 5 Term Rep. 118, shows that
it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to employ the defendant for a
definite time. And in the case of Gravey v. Barnard, Law Rep.,
18 Eq. 518, the Master of the Rolls adopts the words of Lord
Chief Justice TINDAL in Bitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438, "It
is enough if there is a legal consideration and of some value."
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The consideration is therefore good. As to the reasonableness of
the contract, Allsoyp v. Wheateroft, Law Rep., 15 Eq. 59, is not
an authority on a question of partnership, nor is it a case that can
be relied on. There is no hard and fast rule making a covenant
in restraint of trade invalid, if unlimited in area. The true prin-
ciple is shown by the case of the Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont,
Law Rep., 9 Eq. 345. The cases on this point are collected in the
notes to Mitchel v. _eynolds, 1 Smith's L. C., 8th ed., p. 417.
[FRY, J.-I see Willes states that all restraints of trade are primd
facie bad, and then considers the exceptions, and, first, if the
restraint be only particular in respect to the time or place. I
suppose a general restraint of trade means a contract not to carry
on any trade at any time at any place?] Yes, universal. [The
case of Taluis v.. Tallis, 1 E. & B. 391, was also referred to.]
Even if the contract was bad by English law, yet if it was good
according to French law, English courts would uphold it: Quar-
rier v. Colston, 1 Ph. 147; Connor v. Earl of Bellamont, 2 Atk.
882; Story's Conflict of Laws, 7th ed., sect. 242, et seq. English
law on a question of policy does not apply to foreigners resident in
England. As to the judgment obtained by French law, there can
be no doubt that this action is not merged in the French action.
The judgment in France merely forms evidence here of the con-
tract between the parties: Smith v. -Nicoll8, 5 Bing. N. 0. 208.
As to whether the court will go into the question whether a foreign
judgment was obtained by fraud, Martin v. Nicolls, 3 Sim. 458,
shows that this court cannot examine the grounds of a foreign
judgment. This is not a case where the judgment has been
fraudulently obtained, and if that is so, the Bank of Australasia v.
-ihas, 16 Q. B. 717, further illustrates the doctrine that the court
cannot examine the merits. Schibsby v. Westenholz, Law Rep.,
6 Q. B. 155, was a similar action to this, and it shows that a judg-
ment, until set aside, is held conclusive. [FRY, J.-In that case
the contract was held to have been made in England. The present
case is that of a person travelling in France when he entered into
the contract.] The law of the place where the contract was
entered into applies: Copin v. Adamson, Law Rep., 9 Ex. 345;
Becquet v. McCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951; Reimers v. Druce,
23 Beav. 145; and Story's Conflict of Laws, 7th ed., sect. 603,
et seq. They also referred to Young v. Brassey, 24 W. R. 110,
.and Buwhanan v. Bucker, 9 East 192.
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-North, Q. C., and Dundas Gardiner, for the defbndant.-The
contract is unreasonable, because it would deprive the defendant
from selling champagne anywhere. The two cases of Rope v.
Hope, 8 De G., M. & G. 731, and Grell v. Levy, 16 C. B. N. S.
73, show that an agreement contrary to the policy of English law
will be held void, although it is valid by the law of the country
where it was made. The latest case on contracts in restraint of
trade is Collins v. Locke, Law Rep., 4 App. Cas. 674, which shows
that restraints of trade are against public policy, and void, unless
the restraint they impose is partial only. [FRY, J., referred to
the Leather COloth Co. v. Lorsont, and Smith's L. C., vol. 1, p.
431.] Collins v. Locke, shows the bargain may be too large.
Reasonableness is not the only circumstances to be considered.
There must be a limit in space. In Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W.
548, the contract extended to the whole kingdom, and was held
void. [FRY, J.-On the ground that the restraint of trade was
unlimited in space. Would you contend that questions relating to
telegraphs would be unreasonable, even though they encircled the
world?] Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322, shows that any deed
binding a person not to employ himself in any useful undertaking
in the kingdom would be void. [FRY, J.-Does not this merely
mean that the court starts with the proposition that the contract is
bad, and then proceeds to consider how far the circumstances of
the case justify the mitigation of this rule?] Hinde v. Gray,
1 Man. & G. 195, shows that a contract unlimited as to space is
void. [FRY, J.-Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383, shows that
such contracts may extend over all Great Britain.] The Master
of the Rolls expressed doubt as to contracts of that nature, and
only decided as he did in respect of the particular profession then
the subject-matter of dispute. The rule is that a person cannot,
by contract, be excluded from trading in the whole of the country.
In the Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, the question was considered
whether, being unlimited as to time and place, a stipulation not to
communicate a secret was valid or not, and thus the case was
decided on a different point from that of ordinary contracts in
restraint of trade. The present case is not distinguishable from
Allsopy v. Wheatcroft. TVallis v. Day, 2 M. & IV. 273, is
referred to in Pollock on Contracts, 2d ed., p. 314, as being an
instance of a covenant unlimited as to space held good, but in that
case the covenant was really limited, for it was dealing with a
VOL. XXVIII.-95
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trade in a particular space. In Jones v. Lees, 1 H. & N. 189,
restraint was co-extensive with the privilege. In May v. O'Neid,
44 L. J. Ch. 660, cited in Pollock on Contracts, 2d ed., p. 315,
the limit was to particular persons. Where a person covenants
that he will not trade with those persons whose dealings constitute
the good will of a business, that is not a restraint of trade. [The
Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, Law Rep.,
19 Eq. 462, was referred to.] As to the judgment abroad, the
evidence of the French avocat was that the judgment was bad,
unless executed within six months. A foreign judgment might
give a right of action here, but if it goes off by want of execution
the action will fail. The law was settled by Copin v. Adamson.
We submit that signing a document in France relating to a busi-
ness in England constitutes England the locus in quo. Douglas v.
Forrest, 4 Bing. 686, and other similar cases relate to where the
party was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. It is therefore
useless to discuss them. In this case the plaintiffs knew where the
defendant was, and yet they preferred to get a judgment behind
his back. Goddard v. Gray, Law Rep., 6 Q. B. 139, was also
referred to.
FRY, J., said that in this action the plaintiffs sought for an
injunction on two grounds-one on the contract contained in the
letter of the 9th of October 1869, and the other by reason of a
judgment dated the 6th of November 1878, of the Tribunal of
Commerce in France. The two subjects required entirely separate
consideration. There were few facts in controversy, and it was
unnecessary to state the facts of the case in detail, but he would
refer from time to time to such facts as appeared necessary.
He decided that the words "champagne trade" meant the
exporting wine from Champagne or importing into the country
the wines of Champagne, and that there.was a breach of the con.
tract contained in the terms of the letter of the 9th of October,
and said that in the next place it was argued that the contract was
not reasonable.
It was, unquestionably, a rule of law that a contract in restraint
of trade must be reasonable. What was the criterion by which
the reasonableness was to be judged? H took the law on that
point from the judgment of Lord Chief Justice TINDAL, in Hitch-
cock v. Coker, in delivering the judgment of the Court of Ex-
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chequer Chamber on appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench:-
"We agree in the general principle adopted by the court, that
where the restraint of a party from carrying on a trade is larger
and wider than the protection of the party with whom the contract
is made can possibly require, such restraint must be considered as
unreasonable in law, and the contract which would enforce it must
therefore be void." This passage was adopted by Mr. Baron
PARKE in the case of Ward v. Byr-ne, and therefore the rule so
expressed had the authority of the three common-law courts, the
Queen's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer. If, there-
fore, the extent of the restraint was not greater than could possibly
be required for the protection of the plaintiff, it was not unreason-
able.
Another case that threw great light upon the mode of treating
the question was Talli8 v. Tallis; there the plaintiff and defend-
ant had been partners as publishers of books, and part of their
trade, called the canvassing trade, consisted in publishing books in
numbers and employing travellers to sell such books by canvassing
purchasers. On dissolution of the partnership the defendant agreed,
amongst other things, not to carry on the canvassing trade in Lon-
don, or within one hundred and fifty miles of the General Post Office,
nor in Dublin or Edinburgh, or within fifty miles of either, nor in
any town in Great Britain or Ireland in which the plaintiff or his
successors might at the time have an establishment or might have
had one within the six months preceding. The action was for a
breach of the covenant. The defendant pleaded, amongst othei
things, that there were numerous works which the plaintiff did not
publish and did not intend to publish, and which might be pub-
lished with advantage to the public by the defendant, and without
injury to the plaintiff; that the canvassing trade applied to all
such books, and that the restraint as applicable to such books was
therefore unreasonable. The court, however, on such pleading and
also on demurrer, gave judgment for the plaintiff, citing a passage
from Mitchell v. -eynolds, where it was said: "Wherever such
contract stat indifferenter, and for aught appears, may be either
good or bad, the law presumes it primd facie to be bad.' But
instead of adopting that view, the court called attention to what
was said in the case of Afallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 653: "It
would be better to lay down such a limit as under any circum-
stances would be sufficient protection to the interest of the con-
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tracting party, and if the limit stipulated for does not exceed that
to pronounce the contract to be valid." And further on in the
judgment it was stated, "And even if the facts therein stated to
be admitted by the demurrer, and that the reasonableness of the
restriction in question is to be considered with reference to those
facts, together with the facts alleged in the declaration, still we
think the pleas bad. For, although the books capable of republi-
cation may be almost infinite, still the number of subscribers
to such republications coming out in numbers is limited; and
although, if the defendant's books are excluded, it does not follow
that the plaintiff's books would be purchased; still, we cannot
ascertain that the number of subscribers to the plaintiff's books
would not be diminished if the defendant competed with him by
offering other books, especially if they were of a similar character.
And, unless the defendant made it plainly and obviously clear that
the plaintiff's interest did not require the defendant's exclusion, or
that the public interest would be sacrificed if the defendant's
intended publications are excluded, according to the general rule
before referred to, we ought not to hold the contract void." In
other words, the Court of Queen's Bench threw on the defendant,
who alleged the invalidity of the contract on that ground, the
burden of showing that the restraint was obviously more than
the plaintiff's interest required.
In his opinion, such should be the rule of law, because it was to
be borne in mind that the defendant was seeking to put a restraint
upon the freedom of contract, and he who did that should show
that it was plainly necessary for the purposes of freedom of trade.
As to how far the view of the courts invaded the freedom of
contracts, he adopted the decision of the Master of the Rolls in
the case of the Printing and Numerieal Beistering Co. v. Samp-
son. The question then arose, Had the defendant discharged the
burden so cast upon him? It was necessary to look at the facts.
It appeared that the defendant had for some two years been acting
as the representative of the plaintiffs in England, having instruc-
tions to travel over all parts of England and &otland, and at
some time visited Holland for the purposes of their trade. Fur-
ther, the defendant had lived for some four months at Epernay at
the plaintiffs' house, and was thus acquainted with the trade at
both ends; he was, too, a relative of the plaintiffs', and bore their
name. Looking at the extent of the plaintiffs' trade and its diffu-
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sion over England, looking at the facilities for communication
which now existed, he could not say that it was made plain to him
that this contract exceeded in extent that which the plaintiffs were
entitled to for the protection of their trade.
He could conceive cases where such a contract would not be
supported-where there was no injury done to the plaintiff. That
observation applied to Tallis v. Tallis, but in this case, having
regard to the extent of the trade and the difficulty of providing
for every possible case in which injury might arise without includ-
ing certain possible cases in which injury might not arise, he had
come to the conclusion that the contract was not larger than was
necessary for the reasonable protection of the plaintiffs. He held
that that objection failed.
It was said that over and above this rule there existed the rule
that contracts in restraint of trade should be limited in space, and
that because this contract was in terms unlimited, and therefore
extending to the whole of England, meaning England and Wales,
it must be void. How far could such a rule be reconcilable with
the different systems of trading? Many trades extended over the
whole kingdom which by their very nature were extensively and
widely diffused; others were localized. If this rule obtained there
would be complete protection for the latter class of trade, whilst it
would prohibit complete protection to the former. The rule, if it
existed, would apply to two classes of cases: (1) where want of
limitation of space was unreasonable; and (2) where the univer-
sality of the contract was reasonable. In the former case, where
the universality was unreasonable, the rule would operate nothing,
because that was already covered by the rule that the contract
must be reasonable. It would only operate in cases in which the
universality of prohibition was reasonable-that was, this rule
would operate just where it ought not.
For the existence of such a rule he should require the clearest
authority. This rule was pressed on him as an artificial rule-an
absolute rule--called by the late Vice-Chancellor WIcKENs "a
hard and fast rule," but such a rule might always be evaded by
a single exception. No exception could be said to be colorable to
a rule of this description, because whether the exception was color-
able or not could only be judged by the principle of the rule. How
was the question whether or not the evasion was colorable to be
decided by the principle of the rule if the rule was an artificial
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3ne; without principle there was no criterion. He therefore ought
not to hold that there was any such rule unless it was well
established.
There were cases such as Ward v. Byrne and Hinde v. Gray,
but these related only to contracts in which the universality'was
unreasonable, and more than once in Tfard v. Byrne the rule was
so explained, although he candidly admitted that there were other
passages in the judgment in which the court seemed to say that the
universality was always part of the contract. But, undoubtedly,
Vice-Chancellor WICKENS (of whose judgments he could never
speak without the highest respect) came to the conclusion that such
an artificial rule existed, and so he expressed himself in the case
of Allsop v. Wheateroft. Vice-Chancellor WICKENS said: "There
has been a natural inclination of the courts to bring within reason-
able limits the doctrine as to these covenants laid down in earlier
cases, but it has generally been considered in the later as well as
in the earlier cases that a covenant not to carry on a lawful trade
unlimited as to space is on the face of it void. This seems to have
been treated as clear law in Ward v. Byrne and in Hinde v. Gray
and in other cases, and the rule if not obviously just, is, at any
rate, simple and very convenient. No doubt, in the case of the
Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont, Lord Justice (then Vice-Chan-
cellor) JAMES threw some doubt on the existence of a hard and
fast rule, which makes a covenant in restraint of trade invalid if
unlimited in area." There were earlier cases which seemed incon
sistent with the existence of the supposed bard and fast rule. In
Whittaker v. Howe, the case relating to attorneys, it was stipulated
that the business should not be carried on in any part of Great
Britain for twenty years; and again in Jones v. Lees the covenant
was against selling a particular article anywhere in England without
the invention of the plaintiff applied to it, and the objection that the
covenant was unlimited as to space was taken. " It is objected,"
said Mr. Baron BRAMWELL, "that the restraint extends to all
England, but so does the privilege. The cases with respect to the
sale of a goodwill do not apply, because the trade which is the sub-
ject-matter of the sale is local, and therefore a prohibition against
carrying it on beyond that locality would be useless." In other
words, the learned judge explained the inclination against the
universality of a prohibition applying to cases where the subject-
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matter of the sale was itself local. That was just the view he
(FRty, J.) took of the earlier cases.
Still more important was the judgment of Lord Justice JAMES
in the Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont. He came to the con-
clusion that no such rule existed. He said, "I do not read the
cases as having laid down that unrebuttable presumption. * * *
All the cases when they come to be examined seem to establish this
principle, that all restraints upon trade are bad, as being in viola-
tion of public policy unless they are natural and not unreasonable
for the protection of the parties in dealing legally with some sub-
ject-matter of contract."
He had, therefore, to choose between two sets of cases. He
adhered to those which refused to recognise this rule. He con-
sidered that the cases in which an unlimited prohibition had been
spoken of as void, related only to cases where such a prohibition
had been unreasonable. It followed, therefore, that in his judgment
the plaintiffs had established their right upon the contract to have
an injunction. It appeared to him that no sufficient evidence had
been given to induce him to award substantial damages to the
plaintiffs, and he therefore awarded them the sum of one shilling
and no more.
Before he left this part of the case, he must refer to two points
argued by Mr. Cookson. He had insisted that even if the contract
was void by the law of England, as against public policy, yet being
made in France it must be good here; accordingly he proved that
the law of France knew no such principle as that by which unrea-
sonable contracts in restraint of trade are held to be void in this
country. It appeared to his lordship to be plain that the court
would not enforce a contract against public policy wherever it
might be made.
In the next place it was urged that, although the policy of this
country promoted trade amongst its native subjects, there was no
such policy in favor of the trade by foreign merchants, and the
defendant being a foreign merchant it was said he was exempt
from the leaning of English law in favor of trade. It appeared to
him that that view could not be substantiated. The point might
be met by a citation from an elementary book; he therefore
referred to a passage in Blackstone's Commentary, where he dealt
with the mode in which the English law had regarded trade by
foreign merchants. " The law of England, as a commercial coun-
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try, pays very particular regard to foreign merchants in innumera-
ble instances," and then Mr. Justice BLACKSTONE went on to refer
to the provisions of Magna Charta in favor of foreign merchants.
He (Mr. Justice FRY), therefore, held those arguments failed.
He next approached the question raised on the judgment
obtained by the plaintiff in the Tribunal of Commerce at Epernay.
That judgment, according to the evidence before him, was obtained
without any notice being given to the defendant until the proceed-
ings had matured into a judgment. It was not shown, according
to the law of France, the defendant had had any opportunity or
had then power to set aside that judgment if wrong. The French
advocate who was examined on the point seemed to know of no
such provision in the law as seemed to have been proved in some
other cases. Further than that, it had been shown that the judg-
ment was void by French law if not executed within six months,
or if the utmost efforts to execute it were not taken, and it had not
been shown that any such efforts had been taken to execute it, or
that execution had been made upon the judgment.
That being the state of the facts, the law upon this point, he
thought, he might conveniently take from the judgment of the
court in the case of Shibsby v. Westenholz. In that case the court
said: "We think that for the reasons therein given the true prin-
ciple on which the judgments of foreign tribunals are enforced in
England is that stated by Mr. Baron PARKE in Bussell v. Snyth,
9 M. & W. 819, and again repeated by him in Williams v. Jones,
13 M. & W. 33, that the judgment of a court of competent juris-
diction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the
defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given, which the
courts in this country are bound to enforce, and consequently that
anything which negatives that duty, or forms a legal excuse for
not performing it, is a defence to the action."
What circumstances were there which had been held to impose
on a defendant a duty to obey the decision of a foreign court having
regard to that case and the subsequent case of Copin v. Adamson ?
They might, he thought, be stated as follows: Where the defendant
was a subject of the country in which the foreign judgment was
obtained; where the defendant was resident in the country when
the action began; where the defendant in his character of plaintiff
had himself selected the forum in which he was afterwards sued by
the other plaintiff; where the defendant had voluntarily appeared;
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and where he had contracted to submit himself to theforum; and
possibly, if the case of Beequet v. MacCzrthy was right, another
condition might be added, viz., where the defendant had real estate
within the jurisdiction of the foreign court, and in respect of which
the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction.
None of those circumstances were present in this case. In the
present case the contract was made between the plaintiffs, or one
of them, a French subject, and the defendant, a Swiss subject,
domiciled in Switzerland but resident in England, he having been
two years established as the English representative of the plaintiffs'
firm. He happened to be at Epernay on his return home fiom
Switzerland. When he made the contract there was no intention
on his part, or on the part of the plaintiffs, that the defendant
should take up his residence in France. It did not appear that
either party contemplated the performance of the contract in
France, although the terms being universal, it might be observed
or broken anywhere. He was at a loss to find any circumstances
to impose a duty upon the defendant to obey the French court, and
the defendant was, therefore, at liberty to say he was in no way
bound by the judgment. The result was, he held this judgment
was not capable of being enforced in this country, and the whole
of the relief sought in respect to that judgment failed.
Having regard to the large extent to which the plaintiffs had
failed, he thought that the reasonable mode of dealing with the
costs would be to give neither party costs ; therefore there would
be an injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on busi-
ness as importer of champagne for the period of ten years from the
date of contract, and from in any other manner acting in contra-
vention of that contract, with one shilling damages and no costs,
and he would dismiss the action so far as it sought to enforce the
judgment.
In this case, more than in any other, extent of territory covered by the pro-
ancient or modern, is distinctly brought hibition is one element and only one
out the true ground upon which con- element in arriving at the conclusion.
tracts in restraint of trade are declared Some cases seem to have made this a
void, viz., that under the particular cir- final and conclusive test, without any
cumstances of each case, and the nature regard to the nature of the contract, or
of the particular contract involved in whether the public would or not suffer,
that case, the contract must be unreason- or be likely to suffer, any inconvenience
g',le. In determining that question of or detriment if the contract should be
reasonableness or unrensonablencss, the enforced. On the other hand, it seems
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more reasonable to consider the question
of area only a subordinate and not a
dominant consideration; and that while
some contracts might be void, because
unreasonable, if the territory covered by
them were small, other contracts of an
entirely different nature might be valid,
even if a much larger area was included.
It depends, or should depend, upon the
nature of the business, and whether such
business could be done throughout a
large area by one occupying a central
position therein; or whether such busi-
ness mast from its very nature be limited
to a circumscribed locality. In the lat-
ter case a contract might be void when
embracing a much smaller territory than
in the former.
Thus in the business of a surgeon
dentist, which requires the personal pres-
ence of the practitioner and the patient
at the same place, a restraint of practice
within the distance of one hundred miles
may be an unreasonable restraint, as was
held in Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735;
s. c. 5 Moore & Payne 768.
So extensive a restriction is not neces-
sary to protect the promisee in his own
business, and might, therefore, be detri-
mental to the public in the remote places,
and tend to deprive them of such ser-
vices, and without being of any benefit
to any one. The promisee does not nted
the protection ; he can not-upply the de-
mand throughout the entire prohibited
territory, and consequently some persons
must or may suffer, if the contract be
enforced.
On the other hand in the business of an
attorney and solicitor, which to a large
extent may be carried on by correspond-
ence or by agents, a restraint of practice
within a distance of one hundred and
fifty miles from London (Bun, v. Guy,
4 East 190), or even throughout the
whole realm k Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav.
383), may well be held valid.
It may be true that a covenant not to
practice some kind of trade anywhere in
the country, kingdom or state, may be.
void as to that particular kind of business,
as held in Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen
370; Alger v. Tlzacier, 19 Pick. 51 ;
Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 357 ; Mfore v.
Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251 ; Hinde v. Gray, I
Man. & Gr. 195 ; Ward v. Byrne, 5 M.
& W. 548, and some other cases. While
in other trades or business a different
decision should be made, as decided in
many recent cases.
Thus it was long since held in Massa-
chusetts that a contract was valid not to
run a stage from Boston, Mass., to Pro-
vidence, R. I., in opposition to the plain-
tiff's line, although the route embraced
part of two states: Pierce v. F1uller, 8
Mass. 22-3 (1811). The same rule was
applied to a bond "to cease to have any
concern in the business of boating on
Connecticut river," and "not to di-
rectly or indirectly promote any other
boatmen to compete with the plaintiff in
the business of boating," although the
space covered by the contract was the
whole length of the Connecticut, almost
three hundred miles, and across the
whole state of Connecticut, Massachu-
setts (where the contract was made), and
between the states of Vermont and New
Hampshire. Palmer v. Stebbias, 3 Pick.
188 (1825).
And in Perkinsv. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522
(1813), a contract was upheld, made in
Boston, where the parties resided, by
which one covenanted not to engage in
traffic to the northwest coast of America,
for the purpose of there purchasing furs,
to carry to China, although the whole of
the contract was to be performed out of
the state where made.
In Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend.
161 (1839), the court say, "The objec-
tion" there made "seems to take it for
granted that a valid restraint cannot ex-
tend beyond a particular town or city.
That is not the rule. When a good rea-
son appears for allowing the parties to
contract, the restraint may extend far
enough to afford a fair protection to the
other party. How far this will be must
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depend in a great degree tpon the nature
of the trade or business to which the con-
tract relates."
On the same principle it was held in
Harms v. Pairsons, 32 Beav. 328 (1862),
that a contract not to carry on the trade
or business of a horse-hair manufacturer,
"within two hundred miles from the
town of Birmingham," was valid, al-
though the effect of it was to prohibit
the promisor from carrying on the busi-
nes in any part of England or Wales,
except in a corner of Cornwall, and also
in parts of Scotland and Ireland; the
Master of the Rolls saying, "The cases
lay down this principle: that !f the na-
ture of the trade requires it, the extent
excluded may be very great indeed."
In Jones v. Lees, 1 H. & N. 189 (1856)
the plaintiff, having a patent for some
improvements in slubbing and roving
machines, for fourteen years, sold to the
defendant a license to use the invention
any where in England, and the defend-
ant covenanted he would not, during
said fourteen years, make or sell any of
said machines in England, without the
invention of the plaintiff being applied
to them. The contract was held valid,
Bl AMWELL, B., saying, "It is objected
that the restaint extends to all England ;
but so does the privilege. The cases
with respect to the sale of a good will do
not apply, because there the trade, which
is the subject-matter of the sale, is local,
and therefore a prohibition against car-
rying them on beyond that locality would
be useless; here, however, there is no
limit to the place within which the license
is to be exercised.
Contracts not to carry on any business
or manufacturing any articles which may
infringe upon the other party's patent,
may well be co-extensive with the extent
of the patent, or in other words, through-
out the entire country. Billings v. Ames,
32 'Mo. 265 (1862).
So in Leather Cloth Co.v. Lorsont, Law
Rep., 9 Eq. 345 (1869), the vendors of
a patent for manufacturing leather cloth
in England, sold it to the plaintiffs, ani
covenanted that they would not directly
or indirectly carry on in any part ofV Eu-
rope, any manufactory having for its
object the manufacture or sale of pro-
ductions now manufactured by them,"
&c. And this unlimited covenant was
held valid, upon most careful considera-
tion. And the Vice-chancellor said,
"No doubt the covenant is expressed in
very large and full terms; and it is in-
sisted that the mere fact that the coven-
ant is not to carry on, nor allow to be
carried on, "in any part of Europe,"
is in itself what is called a general re
straint of trade, and that what is called a
general restraint of trade is a restraint of
trade throughout the United Kingdom,
and that in that form a restraint of trade
throughout the United Kingdom is upon
the face of it bad, though something
short of it may be allowable, provided
the circumstances justify it. I do not
read the cases as having laid down that
untenable presumption which was in-
sisted upon with so much power by Mr.
Cohen. All the cases, when they come
to be examined, seem to establish this
principle, that all restraints upon trade
are bad, as being in violation of public
policy, unless they are natural, and not
unreasonable for the protection of the
parties in dealing legally with some sub-
ject-matter of contract.
"The principle is this: Public policy
requires that every man shall be at lib-
erty to work for himself, and shall not
be at liberty to deprive himself or the
state of his labor, skill or talent, by any
contract that he enters into. On the
other hand, public policy requires that
when a man has by skill or by any other
means obtained something which he
wants to sell, he should be at liberty to
sell it in the most advantageous way in
the market; and in order to enable him
to sell it advantageously in the market,
it is necessary that he should be able to
preclude himself from entering into com-
petition with the purchaser. In such a
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ease the same public policy that enables
him to do that does not restrain him from
alienating that which he wants to alien-
ate, and therefore enables him to enter
into any stipulation, however restrictive
it is, provided that restriction in the
judgment of the court is not unreasona-
ble, having regard to the subject-matter
of the contract-"
The distinction before stated was fully
approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the late case of Oregon
Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64
(1873), in which the question was
whether a contract was valid by the
Oregon Steam Navigation Company, not
to run a steamer which they were pur-
chasing of the California Steam Naviga-
tion Company, in any of the California
waters, for the period of ten years ; such
stipulation being necessary to protect the
vendors from interference with its own
business, and the contract was sustained ;
and the court said, when speaking of the
extent of a valid restriction, "It is ob-
vious, at first glance, that this must de-
pend upon the circumstances of the par-
ticular case; although from the uncertain
character of the subject, much latitude
must be allowed to the judgment and dis-
cretion of the parties."
Few American cases recognise the prin-
ciple just indicated more fully than that
of the Morse Twist Drill 4- Macine Co.
v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73, decided in 1869.
The defendant there conveyed to the
plaintiffs two patents for improvements
made by him in twist drills and collets,
his machinery and tools, and his rights
in the letters patent ; and also covenanted
for a valuable and sufficient considera-
tion, "to do no act that may injure the
company (the plaintiff) or its business
and that he will at no time aid, assist oi
encourage in any manner any competi.
tion against the same. This contrac
was made in Massachusetts, where all dii
parties then resided, and about fou
years afterwards the defendant "entere
into the manufacture of other twist drill
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and collets in Newark, in the state of
New Jersey, which he sold in the same
markets with the plaintiffs, and in com-
petition with them, at reduced prices,
and to the same persons who dealt with
the defendant when he was in the em-
ploy of the plaintiffs, when he was their
superintendent, and endeavored to sup-
ply the market with these articles ;" and
the question was whether the plaintiffi
were entitled to an injunction. No al-
legation was made that the defendant
had infringed the patents assigned by
him to the plaintiffs, and the case did not
rest at all upon that ground, but it was
held that the business involved not being
local in its character, a contract not to
interfere with it might be valid, although
not restricted in extent; and the demur-
rer to the bill was overruled ; and Cn~a-
3uw, C. J. (who as justice had delivered
the opinion in Taylor v. Blanchard),
after quoting approvingly several late
English decisions, added, "In this coun-
try, there are periodical publications that
have a very wide circulation, and it is
obvious that a purchaser of the proprie-
torship cannot afford to pay the full value,
unless he can obtain from the vendor a
valid restriction against competition,
which restriction shall be as extensive as
his interest requires, though it may cover
the whole of a state, or the whole country.
The same would be true as to some books.
For example, the author of a popular
schoolbook could not sell its proprietor-
ship for its full value, unless he could
bind himself not to prepare another
book, which should be used in competi-
I tion with it. The same would be true
as to some manufactured articles. The
present case furnishes an illustration."
This was followed and approved in a
very elaborate and well-reasoned judg-
- ment, in Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 491
(1875), where it was held, that a con-
tract by a vendor of a printing and pub-
lishing establishment and business and
d good will, together with a newspapet
s and the copyrights of certain book'.
